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ABSTRACT
The market for audit services is modelled as a market with vertical product differentia-
tion, rigid demand, third-party externalities and a liability rule. This framework is used
to choose between full harmonization and mutual recognition as possible international
regulatory regimes for audit quality. It is shown that if third-party externalities are zero,
then full harmonization is at least as good as mutual recognition. If, however,
externalities are not zero, then mutual recognition can yield a higher level of social
welfare than full harmonization. These results are relevant for the debate on the
international regulation of the provision of audit services, especially within the EU, and
show that full harmonization is not necessarily the best option.
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to compare the regimes of full harmonization (FH) and
mutual recognition (MR) as possible international regulatory regimes for quality
control in the market for audit services. In an FH regime the same minimum
requirements for professional qualifications and the same auditing standards are
imposed in all the countries involved.1 Alternatively in an MR regime different
countries mutually recognize foreign qualifications and foreign standards so that
an officially qualified foreign auditor can conduct the audit of a local company
following the standards in place in its country of origin.
The EU has issued directives on both professional training for auditors and
mutual recognition of higher education professional diplomas. However, the
national states may require an administrative check of the curriculum followed by
Address for correspondence
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economia de la Empresa,
Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain. Fax: þ34-91-624 9607; E-mail:
mtrombet@emp.uc3m.es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the foreign auditor in order to qualify, before they recognize foreign qualifications
and the foreign auditor is often de facto required to make up for any difference in
the training between Member States. Given the obvious political difficulties
involved in reaching the international agreement necessary to implement an FH
regime, it is not surprising that EU directives include elements of an MR regime.
So it is fair to ask whether an MR regime is simply an inferior but attainable
arrangement when compared to the ideal FH regime.
In what follows I compare, from an economic perspective, the welfare effects
of the two alternative regimes (FH and MR) for the setting of minimum quality
standards (MQS) for audit and I will show that, contrary to a popular common
belief and under some particular conditions, MR can be superior to FH.
The choice of the particular economic model used was inspired by the
observation of the following peculiar features of the market for audit services:
rigid demand (audit is mandatory for many companies), the presence of positive
externalities (the effects on the so called ‘third party users’) and producers’
liability (auditors may be sued if the company gets into financial distress).2
By looking at these features of the market for audit services, it seems sensible to
model competition in this market as taking place in the price quality space rather
than in the price quantity space. Audit firms can offer to each company a better
audit for a cheaper price, but they do not offer more audits for the same price.
The analysis shows that the choice between FH and MR as possible interna
tional regulatory regimes for audit quality control depends, in general, on the
existence of some strong demand for higher levels of quality of the service
produced. More specifically, when the features of the audit market are taken into
account, third party externalities appear to be crucial. When these externalities
are not taken into account, then FH is equivalent or superior to MR. However,
when these externalities are considered, then MR can be superior to FH.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature in
order to point out what is the original contribution of the analysis. Section 3
presents the general version of the economic model used here and uses it to
explain the intuition behind the results of the paper. Section 4 considers a specific
version of the model that captures some of the features of the market for audit
services and derives the main results of the paper. Section 5 draws some
conclusions.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Two strands of literature are brought together in this paper. On one side we have
the economic literature on minimum quality standards (e.g. Ronnen, 1991;
Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997; Cremer et al.,
1997; Boom, 1995; and Lutz, 1996). With respect to this strand of literature, this
paper is innovative for two reasons: first, it introduces rigid demand and a liability
rule in a model of vertical product differentiation; second, it introduces third party
externalities in the analysis of international quality regulation.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other side we have the literature on auditors’ liability and auditors’
quality choice (e.g. Dye, 1993a, 1993b; Narayanan, 1994; Willekens et al., 1996).
All these papers focus on the case of one auditor auditing one client. They
address neither the issue of quality driven competition for bigger market shares,
nor the international side of the regulation. The model presented here takes
explicitly into account market share competition and international regulation.
Chan et al. (1998) also model the market for audit services as a market with
product differentiation. However, they consider horizontal product differentiation
and study industry specialization effects and do not address the regulation issue.
The model presented here introduces vertical product differentiation into the
analysis of the market for audit services.
3. A GENERAL MODEL
I consider the case of two countries having to decide how to regulate quality in
the audit industry at an international level. An auditor can sell an audit to each
individual client. The audit is identified by its quality q 2 [0, 1 ).
Audit quality regulation can affect directly the observable components of audit
quality, i.e. minimum professional qualification and minimum standards of
conduct. Hence the object of the analysis here are all the observable components
of audit quality that can be ordered in terms of their strictness so that a set of
standards can be defined as more or less demanding than another. So ex ante
audit quality is assumed to be observable by the client in the sense that the client
can observe professional qualifications and declared standards of conduct of the
audit firm.3
We can describe clients’ preferences (the utility derived from an audit of
quality q) using the function
U ðq; p; yÞ ð1Þ
where p is the price=fee paid for the audit and y is a parameter that captures the
client specific willingness to pay for ex ante audit quality. I assume that the
benefit clients extract from having their accounts audited differs among them and
that this is reflected in different preferences for the same combination of quality
and price.4 This difference in preferences is captured by the parameter y.
I assume that there is only one auditor in each of the two countries. If the two
auditors decide to provide different levels of quality, then we will have a high
quality auditor and it will be labelled with the subscript h, and a low quality
auditor that will be labelled with the subscript l. Following the economic
literature on the argument, I assume that the distribution of roles between the
two auditors (high and low) is given and that each auditor offers only one quality.
Any perspective client, no matter which country he resides in, can decide to hire
either the home or the foreign auditor. So in both countries we will have clients
buying high quality audits and clients buying low quality audits.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit technology is the same for both auditors. There is a cost m(q; a) of
conducting an audit, which I assume is a function of the quality of the audit
provided and of a vector of parameters a. All the effects that can be traced back to
audit quality are captured by the direct dependence on q of the function m() and
will be endogenous in our model. All the other effects are captured by the vector
of parameters a and will be exogenous.
I will call xi (i h, l ) the number of clients that each of the two auditor
manages to have. Hence the profit earned by each auditor will be
pi ½ pi mðqi; aÞxi ð2Þ
Given the combination of quality and fee (qh, ph) and (ql, pl) offered by the two
auditors and the distribution f (y) of the parameter y, using standard profit
maximization techniques we can solve the price stage of the game and we can
represent the problem in the quality space as follows:
ph phðqh; ql; aÞ ð3aÞ
pl plðqh; ql; aÞ ð3bÞ
CSh CShðqh; ql; aÞ ð4aÞ
CSl CSlðqh; ql; aÞ ð4bÞ
where CSi is the consumer surplus earned by clients buying audit of quality i.
This is the formulation of the problem I will use in the rest of the analysis.
3.1. Unregulated equilibrium
I start by depicting the equilibrium when no regulatory restrictions are imposed
on quality choice. In this case equilibrium quality levels are determined by
maximizing simultaneously the profit functions of the two auditors, i.e.
max
qh
phðqh; ql; aÞ !
@phðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh
0 ! qhðql; aÞ ð5aÞ
max
ql
plðqh; ql; aÞ !
@plðqh; ql; aÞ
@ql
0 ! ql ðqh; aÞ ð5bÞ
Equations (5a) and (5b) determine what are usually called the reaction functions
of the two auditors. These functions determine the optimal quality choice for each
possible level of quality chosen by the rival. Figure 1 depicts these two reaction
functions for a standard specification of the general model analysed so far.
The crossing of the two functions is the unregulated quality equilibrium. The
position of the unregulated equilibrium will depend on:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the functional form of the profit functions and the value of the vector of
parameters a;
 the functional form of clients’ preferences and the distribution assumed for
the parameter y.
3.2. Regulated equilibrium
I will consider the case of regulation through the imposition of minimum quality
standards (MQS). An MQS is a minimum level of quality that has to be provided
in order to be allowed to operate. In other words, when an MQS is in place, no
quality levels below the MQS can be offered by an auditor.
Following a standard economic approach I will rank different social outcomes
through a social welfare function. For the time being I will adopt the following
very general formulation:
WGðphðqh; ql; aÞ; plðqh; ql; aÞl;CSðqh; qlÞ;Eðqh; ql; zÞÞ WGðqh; ql; a; zÞ ð6Þ
Social welfare depends on the welfare of auditors (i.e. their profits), on the welfare
of the clients (CS CSh þ CSl) and on the welfare of third party users of audit
Figure 1 Auditors’ reaction functions in the quality space.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reports, E(qh, ql; z), which I assume will depend on the quality mix and on a
vector of parameters z. E does not depend on ph and pl because third parties do
not pay for the audit report they use.
The superscript G indicates that this is global social welfare, in the sense that it
includes both countries. We can then define national social welfare functions in an
analogous way. However, we have to take into account that only some of the third
party users, only one auditor and that only part of the clients of each auditor will
be located in each country. Hence we have:
Whðphðqh; ql; aÞ;CShðqh; qlÞ;Ehðqh; ql; zÞÞ Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ ð7aÞ
Wlðplðqh; ql; aÞ;CSlðqh; qlÞ;Elðqh; ql; zÞÞ Wlðqh; ql; a; zÞ ð7bÞ
where the superscripts indicate the country. Country labelling depends on the
quality provided by the resident auditor (e.g. country h is the country of the high
quality auditor). Obviously we will have
Wh þWl WG ð8aÞ
CSh þ CSl CS ð8bÞ
Eh þ El E ð8cÞ
3.2.1. Full harmonization
In an FH regime a unique MQS is imposed on both countries. I assume that the
regulator is benevolent so that the optimal level of the MQS is decided using
global social welfare as the criterion. In an FH regime it is not possible to
influence directly the high end of the quality mix. Once the MQS is imposed this
acts as a lower bound on quality choice and affects directly the quality choice of
the low quality auditor. Then high quality will always be determined by the
reaction function of the high quality auditor, given that high quality is by
definition above low quality and consequently must be greater than or equal to
the unique MQS.
The intuition can be visualized by referring again to Figure 1. Under FH the
social planner cannot maximize social welfare freely in the quality space. He has
to take into account that high quality will always be determined by the reaction
function of the high quality auditor. Hence the FH equilibrium will be located
along the reaction function of the high quality auditor and, given that the regulator
is assumed to be benevolent, this equilibrium will achieve the maximum level of
global social welfare along this line. Notice now that the unregulated equilibrium
is also, by definition, located along the reaction function of the high quality
auditor. If the maximum of the global social welfare function were to the left of
the unregulated equilibrium, then there would be no room for the imposition of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
minimum quality requirements and a quality cap should be used. Given that
quality caps do not seem to be common practice in audit quality regulation, this
case will not be considered here. Hence, if an MQS is imposed under an FH
regime, then it must be that the maximum attainable level of global social welfare
must be on the right of the unregulated equilibrium. So I can now state the
following.
Lemma 1 (FH versus unregulated equilibrium). If an MQS is imposed
under an FH regime, then the level of global social welfare in the FH regime
must be greater than the level of global social welfare that would be obtained
with no regulation.
Proof. Directly from the previous argument and the assumption of a benevolent
regulator. Q.E.D.
3.2.2. Mutual recognition
In an MR regime both countries can impose their own MQS which obviously will
be binding only for their domestic auditor. However, these possibly different
standards are mutually recognized in the sense that a foreign auditor can conduct
an audit of a home company according to the standards in place in the foreign
country. So a home prospective client can choose between hiring the home
auditor and so choose the home level of quality assurance or hiring the foreign
auditor and therefore the foreign level of quality assurance.
The main difference between an FH and an MR regime resides in the fact that
in MR both quality levels (low and high) can be directly manipulated through
regulation. Regulation in the country of the high quality auditor can directly affect
high quality choice and not only through the optimal reaction of the high quality
auditor to low quality regulation, as was the case in the FH regime.
Assuming again benevolent regulators, the optimal level of national MQS will
be determined by looking at national welfare functions and taking into account
the quality level chosen by the foreign auditor. Obviously national MQS can be
effective only if they are set above the quality level that would be chosen freely by
the national auditor. If we refer again to Figure 1, this means that a national MQS
for the country of the high quality auditor, if it is implemented, has to be set
above the reaction function of the high quality auditor. In the same way a national
MQS for the country of the low quality auditor has to be set to the right of the
reaction function of the low quality auditor. Consequently, the quality mix
implemented in an MR regime has to be located in the A region of Figure 1.
We are now ready to understand why an MR equilibrium can yield a level of
global social welfare greater than the level obtained in an FH equilibrium. The FH
equilibrium is a maximum of the global social welfare function, but it is a
constrained maximum, i.e. it has to be located along the reaction function of the
high quality auditor and it is not the global maximum of the global social welfare
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
function. There is absolutely no reason why a quality mix located within region A
or along the best reaction function of the low quality auditor can not be associated
with a level of global social welfare higher than the constrained maximum
implemented through FH.
A first necessary condition for MR to dominate FH is the following: the high
quality audit country must have a national interest in raising the level of quality of
national auditors above the level determined by the free decision of the national
(high quality) auditor.
Analytically, the national optimal level of high quality will be determined by
the national welfare function and in particular by the sign of its derivative w.r.t.
qh, i.e.
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@qh
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@ph
@phðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh
þ @W
hðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@CSh
@CShðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh
þ @W
hðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@Eh
@Ehðqh; ql; zÞ
@qh
ð9Þ
Along the reaction function of the high quality auditor we know that condition
(5a) must be verified. Moreover, an MQS will be implemented only if the quality
chosen freely by the auditor is too small, i.e. only if the derivative of the national
social welfare function, calculated along the reaction function of the high quality
auditor, is positive. This gives us the following necessary condition for MR to be
effective and possibly superior to FH:
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@CSh
@CShðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
þ @W
hðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@Eh
@Ehðqh; ql; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
> 0 ð10Þ
Given that we can assume that social welfare depends positively on clients and
third party utility, i.e.
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@CSh
> 0
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@Eh
> 0
ð11Þ
condition (10) has a fairly straightforward interpretation. An MR regime can be
superior to an FH regime in only one of the following two situations.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1
@CShðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
> 0
@Ehðqh; ql; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
> 0
ð12Þ
In this case both clients and third parties of the high quality country are not happy
with the quality level provided freely by the national auditor. We could have this
situation when a small developed country is negotiating with a large less
developed country. The high quality auditor is likely to be located in the small
developed country. The global demand for very high quality audit services is too
low and the high quality auditor chooses its quality in order to compete with the
low quality foreign auditor in the large foreign market. This situation may create
an under provision of high quality that is likely to be perceived strongly in the
small developed country.
Case 2
If clients and third parties of the high quality country do not agree on the need to
raise high quality, then condition (10) can be read as follows:
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@Eh
@Ehðqh; ql; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
>
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@CSh
@CShðqh; ql; aÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
ð13Þ
Given that third parties do not pay directly for quality it is reasonable to assume that
@Ehðqh; ql; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
> 0 ð14Þ
This means that third parties in the high quality country want to see a higher level
of high quality, whereas clients in the high quality country want to see a decrease
in high quality. Then condition (13) can be satisfied only if third party welfare is
relatively more important than clients’ welfare. This situation is probably more
likely when two similar countries are negotiating. In this case there could be a
general interest in securing a fairly high minimum level of quality, but not
necessarily a very different level of high quality. A decrease in high quality
reduces the difference between the service provided by the high quality auditor
and the service provided by the low quality auditor. This reduction increases price
competition and lowers audit fees, with an obvious advantage for clients and a
possible disadvantage for third parties.
We can summarize the previous argument as follows.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lemma 2 (FH versus MR). The comparison between MR and FH in terms of
global welfare depends crucially on the welfare of clients and third parties of
the country of the high quality auditor.
If both clients and third parties of the high quality audit country do not
want to see a rise in audit quality above the level already provided by the
national auditor, then FH is always the best regime in terms of global social
welfare.
If both clients and third parties of the high quality audit country agree on
the need to raise audit quality, then MR can yield a level of global social
welfare higher than FH.
If, on the other hand, clients and third parties do not agree, MR can
dominate FH only if, in the national welfare function, third parties are
relatively more important than clients.
Proof. Directly from the previous argument. Q.E.D.
Notice the generality of the results so far. In order for them to hold we just need
some standard regularity conditions.5 The possible superiority of MR is based on
a general economic argument summarized mathematically by condition (10) and
more intuitively by Lemma 2. This superiority does not depend on any special
assumption about the size of the countries, liability regimes, clients demand
distribution and so on. The generality of condition (10) and Lemma 2 allows us to
highlight the basic economic intuition behind the result. MR can be superior to
FH when clients and=or third parties have a preference for differentiation in the
supply of audit services and this preference is strongly perceived by national
regulators of the high quality audit country. In this case FH is a limited regulatory
regime because it affects directly only the lower end of the market and tends to
reduce product differentiation.
In order to explore the implications of such a result further we need to specify
the model more precisely and this is what is done in the following section.
4. A FULLY SOLVED MODEL OF THE MARKET
FOR AUDIT SERVICES
4.1. The auditors
I start by specifying the behaviour of the audit firms. The physical cost of each
audit depends on the quality chosen and is given by C(q). I assume
C0ðqÞ > 0 with Cð0Þ 0 ð15Þ
The intuition is as follows. The cost of each audit performed depends on the
particular samples used, the number of accounts checked, the number of partners
and staff dedicated to each audit, and the number of days spent with the client. A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher quality audit will use larger samples, will check more accounts and will
assign more partners to the task. Consequently the cost of each audit increases in
the level of ex ante quality provided.
In addition to the physical cost of producing an audit there is an expected
liability cost associated with each audit performed. It depends on quality and is
determined by the function
LðqÞ s  ZðqÞDðqÞ ð16Þ
The intuition is as follows. Users of accounts utilize the audit report, while taking
their decisions and they can incur losses. s is the joint probability that the client
fails and its financial statements are misstated. When these two events occur
together, the auditor is called into court and can be held liable for the losses
suffered by third parties.
The marginal cost of each case depends on the probability of being held liable
Z(q). I assume the following:
lim
q!þ1 ZðqÞ 0 limq!0 ZðqÞ 1 ð17aÞ
Z0ðqÞ < 0 ð17bÞ
In words, higher audit quality decreases the probability of being held liable in
court. When the auditor is judged liable for the losses, it has to pay a sum D(q).
D(q) can be a constant ( joint and several liability regime) or a decreasing
function (proportional liability regime)6 of q. I will call s  Dð0Þ D, the
maximum expected liability payment that can be sustained by an auditor for
each audit when quality is 0.
The total expected cost of each single audit of quality q becomes
½CðqÞ þ s  ZðqÞ  DðqÞ mðqÞ ð18Þ7
Given the assumptions made on the behaviour of C(q) and L(q), it must be that
lim
q!0
mðqÞ lim
q!0
CðqÞ þ lim
q!0
LðqÞ D ð19aÞ
lim
q!þ1mðqÞ limq!þ1CðqÞ þ limq!þ1 LðqÞ þ1 ð19bÞ
In order to obtain closed form solutions, in the following analysis I will assume
that m(q) has the quadratic form:
mðq; aÞ aq2 bqþ D with a ða; b;DÞ and b2 4 4aD8 ð20Þ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter a captures the physical dimension of audit cost because it is the
parameter that makes audit cost rise with quality as assumed in equation (15).
Parameter b captures the liability dimension of audit cost. Absent any liability,
then low quality auditors would not have any incentive to provide a quality level
other than the minimum.9 Hence, in order to capture the liability effect through
the cost function of the auditor we need to use a cost function that is, at least for a
certain range, decreasing in quality.10
I will assume that b is the same for both auditors no matter which country they
are based in. This does not imply that the liability regime has to be the same in
both countries. We could assume a different b for each country and show that,
through a change of variables, this case is perfectly equivalent to the case of
identical b’s.11
4.2. The countries, clients’ distribution and demand functions
In order to keep the model tractable, I will consider two identical countries. Each
country has exactly half of the prospective clients, and they are uniformly
distributed12 from y 0 to y t. Hence, in each country the density is equal
to 1=t, but the total number of possible clients is normalized to 1
2
.
Client preferences are described by the following function:13
U ðq; p; yÞ yq p ð21Þ
Assumption 1. Each client must buy one audit.
Assumption 1 captures the idea that audit is mandatory for a certain class of
companies and within this class there are companies that would not buy the audit
if it were not mandatory.14 In each country, the market is split between the two
auditors. For any given ph and pl, in order to determine the number of clients for
each auditor, we only have to find y^ such that:
y^qh ph y^ql pl ) y^
ph pl
qh ql
ð22Þ
Then the clients with y > y^ will be audited by the high quality audit firm,
whereas the remaining clients will be audited by the low quality audit firm.
Hence, equilibrium demands for the high quality auditor (xh) and for the low
quality auditor (xl) are as follows:
xhð ph; pl; qh; qlÞ
ðt
y^
1
t
dy
1
t
ðt y^Þ 1
t
t
ph pl
qh ql
 
ð23aÞ
xlð ph; pl; qh; qlÞ
ðy^
0
1
t
dy
1
t
y^
1
t
ph pl
qh ql
ð23bÞ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard profit maximization at the price stage allows us to express the relevant
equations as follows:
phðqh; ql; aÞ
1
9t
ðqh qlÞ½2t aðqh þ qlÞ þ b2 ð24aÞ
plðqh; ql; aÞ
1
9t
ðqh qlÞ½t þ aðqh þ qlÞ b2 ð24bÞ
CSlðqh; ql; aÞ
½aðql þ qhÞ bþ tðaqlqh 3aq2l þ 3bql þ 3tql 2aq2h
þ 2bqh 6D 2tqhÞ
18t
ð25aÞ
CShðqh; ql; aÞ
½bþ 2t aðql þ qhÞðaqlqh 3aq2h þ 3bqh 2aq2l
þ 2bql 6Dþ 4tqlÞ
18t
ð25bÞ
4.3. Unregulated equilibrium
From the profit functions we can derive the auditors’ reaction functions in the
quality space:
qhðql; aÞ
2t þ b
3a
þ 1
3
ql ð26aÞ
ql ðqh; aÞ
t þ b
3a
þ 1
3
qh ð26bÞ
Solving the system of equations (26a) and (26b), remembering that qh; ql5 0,
we get:
qUh
2t þ b
3a
if 04 b4
t
4
b
2a
þ 5t
8a
if b >
t
4
8><
>: ð27aÞ
qUl
0 if 04 b4
t
4
b
2a
t
8a
if b >
t
4
8><
>: ð27bÞ
15
The advantage of this specific version of the model with respect to the general
version presented in the previous section, is the possibility of explicitly observing
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the effect that the liability regime has on quality choice. The stronger is the
incentive effect of the liability system (the higher is b), the higher is the level of
quality offered by both auditors. Moreover, we can appreciate how demand
condition in the market for audit services interacts with liability consideration.
As we can see from (27b) the quality level chosen by the low quality auditor can
be at the minimum, i.e. zero. Its level is determined by the relative magnitude of
the following two contrasting effects.
(a) The rigid demand effect. Demand is rigid in the sense of Assumption 1.
Consequently the low quality auditor will have a share of the market no
matter the level of quality chosen. All clients who would have not bought
an audit, if it was not mandatory, will in principle buy the audit from the
low quality auditor no matter what is the actual level of quality offered.
Given that quality has a material cost, this effect will dictate a quality level
as low as possible, i.e. 0.
(b) The liability incentive effect. To choose a low level of quality is risky
because of the possible liability payments. Hence the liability effect
dictates an increase in the level of quality. Expression (27b) tells us that
if the liability effect is sufficiently strong with respect to the width of the
taste range, then the liability effect dominates the rigid demand effect and
also the low quality auditor chooses a level of quality other than the
minimum.
For a graphical representation of this equilibrium we can use again Figure 1. An
increase in b (tougher liability) would shift both reaction functions inwards, i.e. it
would raise both auditors’ quality levels. On the other hand, an increase in t
(bigger overall market), would shift the reaction function of the high quality
auditor upwards (higher level of quality) and the reaction function of the low
quality auditor leftwards (lower level of quality). This would generate a greater
differentiation with a lower level of quality at the lower end of the market. This is
intuitively correct because an increase in t generates greater demand at both ends
of the market. There is more ‘rigid’ demand at the lower end of the market and
this generates the decrease in low quality level, but there is also more demand at
the upper end of the market and this generates the increase in the high quality
level.
4.4. Regulated equilibrium with no third-party effects
As we know from the general analysis conducted in the previous section, the key
elements in the comparison between FH and MR are clients’ welfare (CS ), third
party welfare (E ), how they are distributed between countries and how they are
weighted in the social welfare function.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equations (25a) and (25b) give us the global welfare of low quality and high
quality clients. Given that I am considering the symmetric countries case, clients
will be equally split between the two countries, i.e.
CSiðqh; ql; aÞ 12CShðqh; ql; aÞ þ 12CSlðqh; ql; aÞ i h; l ð28Þ
Following the spirit of the symmetric case I will also assume that auditors and
clients are equally weighted in the social welfare function and, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume this weight to be the unity, i.e.
@Wi
@pj
@Wi
@CS j
1 i G; h; l j h; l ð29Þ
To understand the crucial role played by third party effects, we begin by analysing
the case of no third party effects, i.e. E 0 and=or @Wi=@Ej 0.
In this case the following is true.
Proposition 1. If third party externalities are not relevant or they are not
considered by the regulator, then under an MR regime auditors are not
constrained in their choice of quality, i.e. qMRl q
U
l and q
MR
h q
U
h . The
highest social welfare is reached under an FH regime, i.e.
W ðqFHl ; qFHh Þ > W ðqUl ; qUh Þ W ðqMRl ; qMRh Þ
Proof. The mathematical proof can be found in the Appendix. Intuitively, the
proof shows that in the relevant range, the necessary condition (10) for MR to
dominate FH is not satisfied. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is fairly simple. Clients at the upper end of the
market are not interested in raising the level of the high quality audit services
already provided in the market. An increase in high quality audit services would
come at the cost of higher fees, and clients’ preference for high quality is not
strong enough to compensate for such an increase. The model without third party
effects is represented in Figure 2.
This figure is similar to Figure 1, but it includes the reaction function of
national regulators ðMQSi ðqjÞ; i 6 j; i; j h; lÞ. As we can see these regulator
reaction functions lie above the corresponding reaction function of the national
auditors for only relatively low levels of quality. When they cross the reaction
function of the national auditor, then MR becomes ineffective because the level of
quality provided by the national auditor is above the national social optimum.
Hence, in this particular case the unregulated equilibrium (U ) coincides with the
mutual recognition equilibrium (MR). However, from a global point of view the
unregulated level of low quality is too low and an FH regime would improve on
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this situation by raising low quality above the unregulated level. For MR to play a
role, we need to introduce third party effects.
4.5. Regulated equilibrium with third-party effects
The number of legal cases based on alleged third party liability of the auditor
brought to court in the recent past proves the importance of ‘third party effects’ in
the audit contract.16 The willingness to take explicit account of these relationships
is the reason for introducing the externality term into the welfare functions of the
model considered here.
In order to be able to go beyond the general result stated in Lemma 2 we need
to give an explicit expression to condition (10). For this reason we need to provide
an explicit expression for third party welfare. I will consider two possible
expressions in sequence.
4.5.1. Weighted average of audit quality
I will first assume that third party welfare is a linear function of the weighted
average of the audit quality provided in the market. The weights are given by the
share of the total number of clients served by each auditor. In the model
considered here these shares coincide with the optimal market demands for
Figure 2 Equilibrium when E¼ 0.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
quality derived previously in equations (23a) and (23b). Hence the first extern
ality expression I consider is the following:
Eðqh; ql; zÞ z½xlql þ xhqh ð30Þ
Given the symmetric countries assumption third party effects will be equally split
between the two countries, i.e.
Ei 1
2
E i h; l ð31Þ
Finally, I assume that
@Wi
@Ei
1 i h; l ð32Þ
We are now able to express equation (10) as follows:
@Whðqh; ql; a; zÞ
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
bðt þ zÞ 2aqlðt þ zÞ þ tð2z 7tÞ
9t
> 0 ð33Þ
It has been impossible to find a set of numerical values for the parameters such
that the welfare under MR is above the welfare under FH.17 This is intuitively
reasonable. If third party welfare enters the welfare function in the way described
by equation (30), the lower quality end of the market dominates. The reason is as
follows. Any minimum quality regulatory intervention in the market will raise the
level of low quality offered by the low quality auditor. This will favour the low
quality auditor because some of the clients that previously chose the high quality
auditor because the low quality offered was too low, will now shift and choose the
low quality auditor. This shift will cause an increase in the share of the market
covered by the low quality auditor and, consequently, a decrease in the share of
the market covered by the high quality auditor in both countries. But when this
happens, then equation (30) tells us the third party users of the high quality
auditor becomes less important as their weight in the externalities function
decreases. So it is not surprising that MR is not an interesting regime, because
the upper end of the market loses importance and, following condition (10), we
know that MR is an effective regime only when the upper end of the market plays
a strong role in terms of social welfare.
4.5.2. Modified weighted average of audit quality
Let us now turn our attention to an alternative specification of the externalities
expression. Given that the key factor is the relative importance of the upper and
lower end of the market, I will now introduce explicit welfare coefficients for
these two components of the externalities function, i.e.
Eðqh; ql; zÞ z½olxlql þ ohxhqh ð34Þ
Given that the market share effect of regulation just described in the previous
section tends to favour the lower end of the market, it is interesting to study a case
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where the welfare coefficients ol and oh counterbalance this effect, i.e. they are
inversely proportional to market shares. So I assume
oi
1
2xi
i h; l ð35Þ
which means that if the share of the market covered by the low quality auditor
rises, then the regulator becomes relatively less concerned with this part of the
market for audit services and shifts its attention to the upper end of the market.
In this case it is shown in the Appendix that it is possible to find numerical
values of the parameters that make MR preferable, from a global point of view, to
FH. So we can now state the following.
Proposition 2. If third party externalities are taken into account by the
regulator(s), then an MR regime can be effective and it can yield a level of
global welfare superior to the FH regime.
Proof. The numerical example provided in the Appendix proves the
proposition. Q.E.D.
Figure 3 represents the various equilibria of this model when a b 1, t 4,
z 8:8 and externalities are described by expressions (34) and (35). The
unregulated equilibrium (U ) implies a minimum level of low quality (i.e.
Figure 3 Equilibrium in Proposition 2 (E 6¼ 0).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(q0 0). In this case the incentive effect of liability is not strong enough to
dominate the rigid demand effect. In this situation the desirability of minimum
quality regulation is very clear. FH raises low quality, but does not affect directly
high quality choice, which is determined by the optimal response of the high
quality auditor. MR affects directly both quality levels (the upper and lower end of
the market) and generates an equilibrium quality mix (MR) which is located inside
the region delimited by the two reaction functions. This equilibrium cannot be
reached either with no regulation or with FH and delivers a level of global social
welfare bigger than the one registered with FH. The 45 line represents the no
differentiation case. As we can see from Figure 3 under MR quality differentiation
is higher than under FH and high quality is higher under MR than under FH. These
two facts together determine the superiority of MR because they visualize why this
situation is preferable for the upper quality end of the market.18
5. CONCLUSIONS
A highly debated issue in the auditing industry, especially within the European
Union, is whether auditing regulation should be conducted at the national level or
at the international level. If we refer to the level of qualifications of the team of
auditors as the measure of the quality of the audit, then the question of who has to
decide the qualifications required to perform audits across the border is far from
being solved. The Commission of the European Union has recently declared the
following.
There is no common view at EU level on the role, the position and the liability of the
statutory auditor. The absence of such a common view has a negative impact on audit
quality and . . . on the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in the
audit field.19
Certainly the specific economic model used here cannot capture all the relevant
aspects of the audit market. However, even within this relatively simple model,
the effects of ex ante audit quality regulation on the different economic actors
involved are fairly complex. These effects may be strictly related to the nature of
the liability of the auditor and on the importance given to the issue of third party
externalities. It has been shown that, in some particular cases, MR may be a
superior solution at the global level.
Throughout the analysis I have taken the distribution of roles between the two
auditors (high and low) as given. One of the consolidated results of the economic
literature on product differentiation is that in an unregulated equilibrium profits
are the same for both auditors. Hence, if we take the unregulated equilibrium as
the starting point of the analysis of regulation, then it is less restrictive to assume
the distribution of roles as exogenous. Obviously once regulation is in place, there
would be an incentive to change role and ‘leap frog’ the rival auditor. So a natural
extension of the analysis presented here would be to consider a dynamic version
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the model and study the possible relocation and=or repositioning effects that
regulation can induce in the market for audit services.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 ðE ¼ 0Þ
We first consider the sign of the derivative of the national welfare function with
respect of qh along the best reaction function of the high quality auditor, i.e.
@Wh
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
1
2
@CS
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
ðb 2aql 7tÞ
18
5 0 , ql4
b 7t
2a
q^l
ðA1Þ
The two best reaction functions of the auditors cross at ðqUl ; qUh Þ and the
parametric expression for this crossing point is given in the main text by
equations (27a) and (27b). Notice that equations (27a) and (27b) always represent
the crossing point of the two reaction functions but they do not always represent
the equilibrium level of quality in an unregulated equilibrium. If the crossing
point involves negative values, then 0 becomes the corresponding equilibrium
level of quality. For the purpose of the proof of Proposition 1, what matters is the
expression of the crossing point and its sign is irrelevant. It is easy to check that
q^l < q
U
l , i.e. the critical value for expression (A1) is located to the left of the
crossing point of the best reaction functions of the two auditors.
Obviously at ql q^l the best reaction function of the high quality auditor and
the best reaction function of the regulator of the high quality country have to
cross. If ql > q^l, then for each qh such that qh q

hðqlÞ we have that
@Wh
@qh

ð@ph=@qhÞ 0
< 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This implies that for ql5 q^l we have that q

hðqlÞ5MQSh ðqlÞ, i.e. the best
reaction function of the high quality country national regulator must be below
the best reaction function of the high quality auditor. Consequently we have
qMRh q

hðqMRl Þ and for any ql5 q^l in an MR regime high quality level is
determined by the best reaction function of the high quality auditor.
In the same way we can calculate a q^h such that for qh > q^h we have that
ql ðqhÞ5MQSl ðqhÞ. So for qh5 q^h in an MR regime low quality level is
determined by the best reaction function of the low quality auditor.
So the best reaction functions of the national regulators can determine the MR
equilibrium only for ql < q^l < q
U
l (high quality country) and qh < q^h < q
U
h (low
quality country). However, in this region we have that MQSh ðqlÞ > qhðqlÞ >
ql ðqhÞ > MQSl ðqhÞ and the best reaction function of the national regulators
cannot cross.
So the MR equilibrium coincides with the unregulated equilibrium. For a
graphical intuition of the argument the reader can refer to Figure 2.
Numerical example for Proposition 2
Equations (34) and (35) imply the following externality function:
Eðql; qhÞ z
ql þ qh
2
z > 0 ðA2Þ
Imposing a b 1 and t 4 we get the following global welfare function:
W ðql; qhÞ 38 ql 112 q2l 572 q2l qh 572 q3l þ 218 qh 1112 q2h þ 572 q3h
þ 5
72
qlq
2
h
Dþ z ql þ qh
2
ðA3Þ
By plugging in the best reaction function of the high quality auditor and taking
the first derivative w.r.t. ql we obtain:
dW
dql
2
3
þ 2
3
z 20
81
q2l
10
27
ql 0 ) ql 34 þ 320 5
p
29 þ 24zp ðA4Þ
If we substitute z 8:8 we get qFHl 4:44832 ffi 4:45. Using the reaction
function of the high quality auditor we get qFHh q

l ðqFHl Þ 4:48277 ffi 4:48.
Moving to the MR regime we have
Wl
19
16
ql þ 516 qh 18 q2h þ 5144 q3h 5144 q3l 12 Dþ 5144 q2hql 5144 qhq2l
3
8
q2l þ 12 z
qh þ ql
2
 
ðA5Þ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then
@Wl
@ql
19
16
5
48
q2l þ 5144 q2h 572 qhql 34 ql þ 14 z 0 ðA6Þ
from which
MQSl ðqhÞ 13qh 185 þ 115 100q2h þ 540qh þ 5481 þ 540z
p
ðA7Þ
Analogously
Wh
37
16
qh
5
144
qhq
2
l þ 5144 q2hql 1924 q2h þ 724 q2l 1316 ql 5144 q3l
þ 5
144
q3h
1
2
Dþ 1
2
z
qh þ ql
2
 
ðA8Þ
@Wh
@qh
37
16
5
144
q2l þ 572 qhql 1912 qh þ 548 q2h þ 14 z 0 ðA9Þ
MQSh ðqlÞ 13ql þ 385 115 100q2l 1140ql þ 8001 540z
q
ðA10Þ
If we substitute z 8:8 and we solve for MQSh ðqlÞ MQSl ðqhÞ we obtain
qMRl 3 and q
MR
h 4:8 ðA11Þ
Then
W qMRl ; q
MR
h
 
33:78 D > 32:854 D W qFHl ; q
FH
h
  ðA12Þ
NOTES
1 In an FH regime the standard could be set by an international regulatory body, e.g. the
International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) of the International Federation of
Accountants.
2 The extent to which an auditor owes a duty of care to third-party users of the accounts
is a controversial issue. In all the EU countries the auditor is exposed to civil liability,
but the scope of this liability varies. It always covers the contractual parties, i.e. the
auditee company, but it does not necessarily involve third parties; see Buijink et al.
(1996: Section 2.3.7) and Gwilliam (1997). The paradox of requiring a mandatory
audit and then denying the duty of care to third parties is clearly expressed by Grout
et al. (1994): ‘Of course, it is common knowledge (even to the courts) that the accounts
serve a larger purpose in informing investment decisions, and moreover, this further
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
purpose may justify having a statutory requirement for independently audited accounts
but then why deny these third parties the protection of the law?’
3 The meaning of audit quality in this model is slightly different from the meaning it
takes in many of the models of the audit relationship already existing in the literature.
In those models (e.g. Dye, 1993a) q is seen as the level of effort provided by the auditor
and it is assumed to be verifiable in court ex-post, but not observable and=or
contractible ex-ante. This is all that matters when the object of the analysis is the
incentive effect of the liability system. However, here the focus is on ex-ante regulation
of audit quality.
4 We can think of y as the valuation effect associated with conducting and disclosing an
audit. The audit is often seen as a signal sent to investors that affects the valuation they
give to the company. Hence a higher y means that, for a fixed level of audit quality, the
valuation effect is higher. The valuation effect of the audit is often quoted as one of the
drivers of the demand for audit services. Falk and Lally (1998) have formally modelled
the demand for audit services starting from this assumption.
5 In particular we need to assume that the profit functions are differentiable and concave.
6 Narayanan (1994) correctly points out that the incentive effect of the liability regime is
as important as the absolute effect. Suppose we are comparing a joint and several
liability regime with a proportional liability regime. The level of maximum liability
payments that an auditor can be asked to pay in case of bankruptcy of the client is
higher under joint and several liability. However, under joint and several liability an
increase in the quality of the audit provided only reduces the probability of being held
liable, but it does not affect the amount of the payment in case the auditor loses the
case. On the other hand, under a proportional liability regime an increase in audit
quality decreases both the probability of being held liable and the amount of the
payment in case the auditor loses the case. In the model presented here the case of joint
and several liability implies a constant D, whereas the case of proportional liability
implies a D decreasing in q.
7 This cost function is similar to the one used by Dye (1993a), Willekens et al. (1996)
and Frantz (1999).
8 This condition guarantees that marginal cost is always positive. The quadratic form has
been used extensively in the economic literature. See, e.g., Ecchia and Lambertini
(1997) or Scarpa (1998).
9 Cf., e.g., Dye (1993a), Naranyanan (1994) and Ewert (1999). In all these models, if we
eliminate the liability effect, then audit quality choice in equilibrium is at the minimum.
This is due to the fact that without liability effects, audit quality choice becomes a
physical cost minimization activity and this fact delivers the minimum possible level as
the optimum choice.
10 Generally speaking the value of b will depend on the probability of a failure and
misstatement in the accounts (s) and the legal systems (shape of Z()), i.e. b(s, Z) with
b(0, Z) 0 and b(s, 0) 0.
11 The proof is available from the author.
12 The symmetry and uniform distribution assumptions are standard in the economics
literature on product differentiation. They are quite strong, but they bias the model
towards FH. As we have seen in the previous section the key to the possible superiority
of MR is a strong preference for high quality and=or a possible difference between
countries in favour of the high quality country. So if we can show that MR can be
superior in a symmetric case then a fortiori it should be superior if we assume that
demand is skewed towards high quality (high y’s) and=or when the high quality audit
country is smaller. At the other end, when clients’ demand is skewed towards low
quality (low y’s) and=or when the high quality audit country is bigger, then FH is more
likely to be the dominant regime.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Equation (21) implies that given a certain price, the client always prefers high quality to
low quality. This assumption may be questioned when we refer to (unobservable) audit
effort. In this case a client who has something to hide may prefer low effort to high
effort. But if we focus on observable features of the quality of the audit firm engaged,
then even a negligent client still prefers to engage an audit firm of the highest possible
quality, because of the signalling effects of such an engagement. They will then try to
collude with the auditor in order to manipulate the final audit report.
14 Given the assumptions on the distribution of consumers, this market would not be
automatically covered in equilibrium. One of the consequences of Assumption 1 is that
in equilibrium total clients’ welfare may be negative. However, clients’ welfare must
not be confused with clients’ profits. Clients’ welfare is simply the utility derived from
the audit report. So a negative level of utility can be loosely interpreted as an audit tax
the client has to pay because of the imposition of mandatory audit.
15 If 0 4 b 4 t=4 the two reaction functions would cross on the negative side of the q0
axis. Given that this is not possible, in this case the equilibrium level of low quality is
constrained at 0 and the equilibrium level of high quality is determined as the best
response to a 0 low quality level.
16 For a survey, cf. Gwilliam (1997).
17 Cf. the Appendix.
18 However in the numerical example used to prove Proposition 2 we have that
W0(MR)>W0(FH ) whereas Wh(MR)<Wh(FH ). So a shift from FH to MR benefits
the low quality auditor country and harms the high quality auditor country. Hence the
implementation of an MR regime may depend crucially on the ability to reach an
agreement on some mechanism of international compensation between countries. I am
very grateful to one of the referees for raising this point.
19 Cf. EU Commission (1996, 1998).
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